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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent#
v.
KENNETH JAMES MORRELL,
:

Case No. 890031-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code
Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f)("appeals from district court in
criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first
degree or capital felony").
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did the trial court deny Appellant's state and
federal rights to confrontation and violate the hearsay rule in
allowing Officer Wayment to present hearsay evidence?
2. Did the trial court deny Appellant's state and
federal rights to confrontation in blocking cross-examination of
the State's key witness?
3. Did the court err in allowing the prosecutor to
introduce evidence concerning Appellant's failure to exculpate
himself after his arrest, but prior to his receipt of Miranda
warnings?
4. Is a guilty plea a "conviction" that is properly
admissible under Rule 609?
5. Is robbery a crime of dishonesty, and therefore
1

admissible under Rule 609(a)(2)?
6. Was the evidence of an unrelated robbery admitted in
violation of rule 404?
7. Was the evidence of an unrelated robbery admitted in
violation of rule 403?
8. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error?
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Pertinent statutory and constitutional provisions are
set forth in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 2, 1988, Appellant was convicted by a jury
of robbery, a second degree felony violation of Utah Code Ann.
section 76-6-301 (R. 118).

The trial court sentenced Appellant

to serve one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (R. 122).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Matthew Moor, a nineteen year old delivery man for
Ambassador Pizza, testified that on September 4, 1988, at about
five minutes to twelve at night, he was told to deliver pizza and
condiments to 813 Genessee Street (T. 12-15).

He indicated that

this was to be the last delivery of the night, and that he saw
Appellant standing on the corner a few houses away from where the

1

Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-301 provides as follows:
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and
intentional taking of personal property in
the possession of another from his person or
immediate presence, against his will,
accomplished by means of force or fear.
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second
degree.
2

pizza was to be delivered (T. 14-15).

Mr. Moor indicated that he

asked Appellant if they were on Genessee Street, and Appellant
indicated that they were (T. 15-16).

After Mr. Moor knocked on

the door of the home where the pizza was to be delivered and got
no response, he indicated that he and Appellant apparently
discussed the possibility of Appellant buying the pizza from Mr.
Moor (T. 16).
Mr. Moor said that as he sat in his car and Appellant
stood outside, Appellant began searching his pockets for five
dollars with which to buy the pizza, and then grabbed Mr. Moor,
held a knife to him, and told him he was being robbed (T. 18, 5253).

Mr. Moor indicated that he could feel that Appellant had

something pointed in his hand, that Mr. Moor could not tell
whether it was "a knife or a gun or whatever", but that
Appellant told him more than once that he had a knife (T. 19-20).
Mr. Moor indicated that by mutual agreement, the pizza
and drink were placed on the ground, and at Appellant's command,
he gave Appellant the car keys and gave Appellant twenty-five or
twenty-six dollars out of his right pants pocket (T. 20-21, 5253).

He testified that Appellant asked Mr. Moor where his "bank"

was (the bag containing money for the pizza company), and had Mr.
Moor drive to a very dark place where Appellant searched Mr.
Moor's car and found a five dollar bill (T. 22-24).
On cross-examination, Mr. Moor also testified that
Appellant gave all of the money back to Mr. Moor and had him
count it (T. 46). After Mr. Moor told Appellant how much money
3

there was, Appellant told him that the sum was not emough (T.
46).

After viewing the transcript of his preliminary hearing

testimony, Mr. Moor explained that he counted the money twice (T.
49).
Mr. Moor indicated that he then drove to a vacant house
on 10th East and 4th South, four blocks away from Ambassador
Pizza, telling Appellant that a girl living there might give Mr.
Moor more money for Appellant (T. 25). Mr. Moor explained that
he knew that his girlfriend had moved out of the house, but
thought he might run from that house to Ambassador Pizza and get
some assistance (T. 25).
On cross-examination, Mr. Moor was able to recall some
discussion between himself and Appellant about going to Mr.
Moor's mother's house to get more money (T. 57).
Mr. Moor indicated that Appellant was using his shirt
to hide his face from Mr. Moor, and that Appellant asked Mr. Moor
for his Ambassador Pizza shirt, but that Mr. Moor didn't want to
give this to Appellant because he was afraid that Appellant would
notice that Mr. Moor had his bank stuffed down his pants (T. 2526).

The bank contained about eight hundred dollars, and there

was also some money in Mr. Moor's left pants pocket, but he did
not give any of this money to Appellant (T.25-26, 53). Mr. Moor
stated that the reason he gave Appellant the money that he did
was because Appellant said he would kill him, and Mr. Moor was
extremely fearful (T. 24, 67).
Mr. Moor indicated that Appellant then directed him to
4

drive to the avenues to find a vacant house from which they could
rob a Domino's Pizza delivery person, and that they went to a
pay phone on Eighth East and Second South, from which Appellant
had Mr. Moor dial the number for Domino's (T. 26-28).

Mr. Moor

testified that after discovering that Domino's was closed,
Appellant told Mr. Moor he was tired of playing games, and
threatened to use the knife on Mr. Moor if he did not produce the
amount of money Appellant wanted (T. 29).
Mr. Moor then told Appellant that his friend, Ivan
Ilov, had taken Mr. Moor's bank and might have some money, and
they drove to Mr. Ilov's house at 1985 South 200 East (T. 30,
57).

Mr. Moor indicated that Appellant directed him to honk his

horn and yell for Mr. Ilov (T. 30). Mr. Moor said that when Mr.
Ilov came out of his house, while Appellant had the knife pressed
to Mr. Moor's rib cage, Mr. Moor told Mr. Ilov that Appellant had
a knife held to him and wanted money (T. 31, 59). Mr. Moor
indicated that Mr. Ilov broke the window on the driver's side of
the car, Mr. Moor grabbed Appellant's wrists and began wrestling
with him, and that Appellant wrestled himself free and began
running (T. 31-33).
Mr. Moor testified that when he chased after Appellant,
Mr. Moor had a weapon, and that Appellant hit Mr. Moor in the
nose (T. 62). After Appellant hit Mr. Moor in the nose, Mr. Moor
chased him further and caught him (T. 63). Mr. Ilov then caught
up with them and hit Appellant a couple of times, after Mr. Moor
had restrained Appellant completely (T. 64). A nearby cabdriver
5

called the police (T. 33-35).
Mr. Moor testified that he had not met or seen
Appellant prior to that evening on September 4, 1988 (T. 35-36).
Mr. Moor testified that he is five feet eleven and a
half inches tall, and weighs one hundred and fifty five pounds
(T. 64). Appellant is five feet seven inches tall and weighs one
hundred thirty-five pounds (T.2 40).
Ivan Ilov, a thirty-six year old former employee of
Ambassador Pizza testified that on September 4, 1983, at two
o'clock in the morning, Mr. Moor was in Mr. Ilov's driveway,
honking for him (T. 69-71).

He indicated that when he first

went outside, he thought they were playing a joke on him, but
then thought that Appellant was stabbing Mr. Moor and broke the
car window (T. 70-73).

He indicated that when Appellant began

running away, Mr. Ilov gave chase, but was slower than Appellant
because he had a broken leg and no shoes on (T. 73-74).

Mr. Ilov

indicated that after Mr. Moor caught Appellant, Mr. Ilov held
Appellant for forty minutes until the police arrived, and that
before they arrived, Appellant threw the money on the ground and
Mr. Moor retrieved it (T. 76).
Mr. Ilov never heard Appellant say anything about a
robbery or saw a weapon in Appellant's hands (T. 81).
Officer Allred testified that when Appellant was
searched by the police, they took a name tag, a five dollar bill,
and a one dollar bill from Appellant's pockets (T.2 15-16).
Appellant testified that on September 4, 1988, around
6

12:00, he was dropped off from work at his home address, 814 West
800 South (the initial encounter between Appellant and Mr. Moor
occurred at 813 West and 850 South (T.2 19)) (T.2 21-22).
Appellant indicated that shortly after he was dropped off on the
corner of 8th South and 8th West, he saw Mr. Moor's car and
recognized both the car and Mr. Moor (T.2 22). Mr. Moor asked
Appellant if they were on Gennessee street, and Appellant said
yes (T.2 23). After Mr. Moor got back into his car, Appellant
asked Mr. Moor if he remembered Appellant (T.2 23). Mr. Moor did
not answer, but looked at Appellant with astonishment (T.2 24).
When Mr. Moor repeated the question, Mr. Moor did not respond,
but began pushing the pizza and drink out of the window of his
car (T.2 25). Appellant got in Mr. Moor's car and began talking
with him concerning a debt Mr. Moor owed Appellant (T.2 25).
Appellant had met Mr. Moor twice at parties, and at the second
party had given Mr. Moor some marijuana with the understanding
that Mr. Moor would pay him $45 for it later (T.2 25-26).
Appellant indicated that Mr. Moor acknowledged the
debt, and that after Appellant demanded payment, Mr. Moor pulled
some money out of his pocket and gave it to Appellant, who gave
it back to Mr. Moor, asking him to count it (T.2 27). After they
determined that there were twenty one dollars, Appellant demanded
full payment, and they discussed getting it from Mr. Moor's
mother's house, and eventually went to Mr. Moor's girlfriend's
house to get the money (T.2 28). When no one answered at that
house, Mr. Moor then suggested that they go to his friend's
7

house, and they drove to Ivan's (T.2 31). Mr. Moor yelled to
Ivan, who came out of the house (T.2 33). After Mr. Moor told
Ivan he needed some money with which to repay Appellant, Ivan
asked Appellant who he was and Appellant told him that it didn't
matter, and that Mr. Moor owed him some money (T.2 33).
Ivan then broke the window, Mr. Moor began wrestling
with Appellant, who struggled free and began running (T.2 34).
Mr. Moor swung at Appellant, and Appellant hit him in the nose,
and eventually Mr. Moor and Mr. Ilov restrained Appellant, and
Mr. Ilov struck Appellant's head on the ground repeatedly and
kicked and hit him (T.2 35-36).
Appellant testified that he was never armed with a
knife and that the name tag in his pocket was the one he wore at
work, and that he never used it as a weapon against Mr. Moor (T.2
39).

Appellant grabbed Mr. Moor only once, during their initial

encounter when Mr. Moor began pushing the pizza out of the window
toward Appellant (T.2 40). Appellant never offered to buy the
pizza or threatened to stab or kill Mr. Moor (T.2 41, 50). After
Mr. Moor counted the money ($21), he never gave it back to
Appellant, who would not accept less than the full amount due
(T.2 4 1 ) . Appellant did not rob Mr. Moor, but was attempting to
collect on a debt (T.2 53-54).
Prior to Appellant's testimony, the State was allowed,
over objection, to introduce evidence that when Appellant was
arrested, he did not tell the police any exculpating information
(T.2 13, 54-55).
8

Over objection, the State was allowed to present
evidence of an unrelated robbery of a pizza delivery man, Paul
Christensen, to which Appellant had pled guilty at the time of
this trial (T.2 73-80).

Mr. Christensen testified concerning the

facts underlying the guilty plea.
Over objection, the State was allowed to present the
Officer Wayment's testimony that the telephones used to order the
pizza involved in the robbery of Mr. Christensen and used to
order the pizza involved in the encounter with Mr. Moor were not
located at the addresses at which the pizzas were to be delivered
(T.2 80-86).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In admitting the hearsay testimony of Officer Wayment
concerning the statements of the telephone callers involved in
this case and involved in an unrelated pizza delivery person
robbery, the trial court violated the hearsay rule and
Appellant's rights to confrontation.
In blocking cross-examination of Mr. Moor concerning
his drug and alcohol use, and their connection to his inability
to recall a drug debt owed Appellant, the trial court violated
Appellant's rights to confrontation.
In admitting evidence of Appellant's silence during
police questioning occurring after his arrest and prior to his
receipt of Miranda warnings, the trial court erred.
A guilty plea, for which no judgment and sentence have
been entered, is not admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 609
9

as a conviction.

Robberies are not crimes of dishonesty

automatically admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2).
Inasmuch as the trial court ruled to the contrary in admitting
evidence of Appellant's guilty plea to robbery, the trial court
violated Utah Rule of Evidence 609.
In admitting evidence of the facts underlying the
guilty plea, the trial court indicated that those facts were
probative of intent and modus operandi.

Because Appellant's

intent during the encounter with Mr. Moor was neither in issue
nor elucidated by reference to the facts underlying the guilty
plea, and because "modus operandi" was neither relevant nor
demonstrated by the facts underlying the guilty plea, the trial
court violated Rule of Evidence 404.
The facts underlying the guilty plea were designed to
lead the jury to infer that Appellant was guilty of the robbery
charged in this case because he was predisposed to do so, as
evidenced by the facts underlying his guilty plea to robbery.
Because this evidence had no legitimate probative value and was
prejudicial, the court violated Utah Rule of Evidence 403 in
admitting it.
The trial court's errors were prejudicial.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S
RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION.
In Kentucky v. Stincer, 428 U.S. 730 (1987), the United
States Supreme Court explained the two ways in which the
10

Confrontation Clause, which is designed to "insure the
reliability in the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial",
is violated:
In the first category of cases, the
Confrontation Clause is violated when
"hearsay evidence [is] admitted as
substantive evidence against the
defendan[t]," with no opportunity to crossexamine the hearsay declarant at trial, or
when an out-of-court statement of an
unavailable witness does not bear adequate
indications of trustworthiness....
The second category involves cases in
which the opportunity for cross-examination
has been restricted by law or by a trial
court ruling.
Id. at 737-738 (citations omitted, brackets by the Court).
The trial court in this case violated Appellant's
2
rights to confrontation in both ways - by allowing Detective
Wayment to present unreliable hearsay evidence from witnesses who
were never shown to be unavailable, and by blocking crossexamination of the State's key witness, Mr. Moor.
A. OFFICER WAYMENT'S TESTIMONY PRESENTED UNRELIABLE HEARSAY FROM
WITNESSES WHO WERE NOT SHOWN TO BE UNAVAILABLE.
As is discussed infra, the prosecution was allowed to
present testimony concerning a robbery of a deliveryman from
Ambassador Pizza, Mr. Christensen, to which robbery Appellant had
entered a plea of guilty (T.2 55, 73-80).
The State called Detective Wade Wayment, who testified

2
In State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), the Utah
Supreme Court determined that the Utah Constitutional provision
relating to confrontation, Article I section 12, would be
construed in a manner paralleling the federal counterpart. Id.
at 539.
11

over objection that the telephone used to call Ambassador Pizza
on the night of the robbery of Mr. Christensen and the telephone
used to call Free Wheeler Pizza on the night of the incident
involving Mr. Moor were not located at the addresses where the
pizzas were to be delivered (T.2 81-82, 8 4 ) . Officer Wayment did
not indicate the names of the people calling the pizza companies
and leaving the telephone numbers, and did not indicate the names
of the witnesses who recorded the telephone numbers.
The trial court apparently admitted this evidence
because it had been recorded in a police report in the normal
course of business (T.2 83).
1. OFFICER WAYMENT1S TESTIMONY VIOLATED THE HEARSAY RULE.
Contrary to the trial court's assumption that
information contained in police reports recorded during the
normal course of business is reliable, the Utah Rules of Evidence
indicate that such information is inadmissible hearsay.
Utah Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted."

The telephone numbers presented through

Officer Wayment constituted assertions that the persons calling
Ambassador Pizza and Free Wheeler Pizza had actually called the
pizza companies and left the specified telephone numbers and
addresses, and were calling from
specified locations.

specified telephones at

Neither the persons calling the pizza

companies, nor the persons recording the telephone numbers at the
12

pizza companies were present in court.

Thus, the evidence

presented in court relating to the telephone numbers involved
multiple layers of hearsay. 3
Utah Rule of Evidence 802 indicates that "[h]earsay is
not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules."

The

only hearsay exception which might be applicable to a police
report is Utah Rule of Evidence 803(8), which excepts the
following from the proscription of the hearsay rule:
[r]ecords, reports, statements, or data
compilations, in any form, of public offices
or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities
of the office or agency, or (B) matters
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as
to which matters there was a duty to report,
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters
observed by police officers and other law
enforcement personnel, or Tel in civil
actions and proceedings and against the
Government in criminal cases, factual
findings resulting from an investigation made
pursuant to authority granted by law, unless
the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
(Emphasis added).

As demonstrated by the language emphasized

above, Officer Wayment's quotation of the police report violated
the hearsay rule.

See also State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah

1983)(discussing the foundational requirements for admission
under the business and public records exceptions, and explaining
why hearsay contained in police reports is generally not
admissible under these exceptions to the hearsay rule).
3
See Utah Rule of Evidence 805, which provides: "Hearsay
included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if
each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception
to the hearsay rule provided in these rules."
13

2. OFFICER WAYMENT'S TESTIMONY VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO
CONFRONTATION.
In presenting hearsay testimony from the persons
calling the pizza companies, as filtered through the employees of
the pizza companies and Officer Wayment, the State completely
failed to carry its burden under the Confrontation Clause, which
the United States Supreme Court described in Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56 (1980):
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not
present for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause normally requires a
showing that he is unavailable. Even then,
his statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate "indicia of reliability."
Id. at 66.
B. IN PROTECTING MR. MOOR FROM CROSS-EXAMINATION, THE TRIAL COURT
VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION.
During cross-examination, Mr. Moor testified that he
had not met Appellant prior to September 4, 1988, and that he did
not know a Scott Perry from West Jordan (T. 42-43).

When asked

by defense counsel if it were possible that Mr. Moor had met
Appellant at a party near Trolley Square, Mr. Moor responded,
"Well, there have been parties that I have been to where I don't
remember anything.

So, I don't know.

I don't remember ever

having seen Mr. Morrell, ever." (T. 43).
When defense counsel inquired about the connection
between Mr. Moor's poor memory and alcohol and drug use, the
prosecutor objected, and the trial court sustained the objection
(T. 43). The trial court also sustained an objection to a
question concerning Mr. Moor's having bought marijuana from
14

Appellant, and stopped defense counsel from asking Mr* Moor if it
were possible that he met Appellant at a party and didn't
remember it for some reason (T. 44).
During cross-examination of Appellant, the prosecutor
was able to discuss the drug transaction freely, and emphasized
the illegal nature of it.

See T.2 46-48, 51 (appendix 1 ) .

The only facts in dispute in this case were subject to
proof by two opposing witnesses - Appellant and Mr. Moor.

In

protecting Mr. Moor from questions which could have substantiated
Appellant's version of these facts and undermined Mr. Moor's
version of the facts, the trial court violated Appellant's rights
to confront this crucial witness against him.

Kentucky v.

Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 738 (1987), supra.
II.
IN ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR TO ELICIT
EVIDENCE OF APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO EXCULPATE
HIMSELF AFTER HE WAS ARRESTED BUT PRIOR TO HIS
RECEIPT OF MIRANDA WARNINGS, THE COURT ERRED.
Appellant called Officer Susan Neeley, who testified
about Appellant's arrest, indicating that when the officers
searched his body, they took nothing from him (T.2 3 ) . During
cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Officer Neeley if during
the time that Appellant was restrained and after he had been
patted down, but prior to his "arrest", he had made any comments
to her (T.2 5 ) . Defense counsel objected and a hearing was held
outside the presence of the jury (T.2 5 ) .
The prosecutor indicated that he intended to show that
Appellant did not exculpate himself by telling the officers that
15

he was collecting a debt, and argued that there was no
infringement of Appellant's rights against self-incrimination
because the prosecutor's question would be directed to the time
frame prior to Appellant's official arrest (T.2 6-7).

The

prosecutor agreed with the trial court's assessment of the law,
that "if, in fact, he had been detained and was held and knew he
could not leave, that that would be tantamount at that point,
subject to restraint as to require Miranda warning in regards to
any statements that might be made", and Officer Neeley was then
questioned outside the presence of the jury concerning the
circumstances of the arrest (T.2 7 ) . Officer Neeley was
apparently present when the trial court and prosecutor discussed
the applicable law (T.2 8 ) .
Officer Neeley indicated that she was called to
investigate a fight and a "missing pizza driver", and that when
she arrived at the scene of the arrest, Appellant was bent over a
mailbox and Mr. Ilov was restraining him by holding his arms
behind his back (T.2 8-9).

She indicated that after Mr. Moor

exited the Sconecutter restaurant, she and Officer Miller stood
on opposite sides of Appellant, and "held him at that position"
(T.2 9 ) . Without giving any Miranda warning, Officer Miller then
asked Appellant what was going on and he did not respond (T.2.
9).

During this conversation, Officer Miller was restraining

Appellant by holding his arm behind his back, and Appellant was
never free to leave (T.2 10-11).
Officer Neeley indicated that from her perspective,
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Appellant's detention constituted detention of a suspect when Mr.
Moor exited the Sconecutter restaurant and told her what had
happened (T.2 11).
Apparently adopting the prosecutor's argument that
Appellant's rights against self-incrimination did not attach
until the police officers restraining him considered him a
suspect in a crime, and apparently ignoring the fact that Officer
Neeley's testimony indicated that she viewed Appellant as a
suspect prior to Officer Miller's questioning of Appellant, the
trial court allowed the prosecutor to introduce the evidence of
Appellant's failure to exculpate himself (T.2 12).
In front of the jury, Officer Neeley testified as
follows:
Q How long — Well, during the time that
you were with Mr. Morrell at that point, did
he make any statements to you about what had
happened?
A No.
Q Was he asked what happened?
A Yes, Officer Miller asked him what was
going on. There was no response.
(T.2 13). Defense counsel again established that as soon as the
officers arrived on the scene, they took physical custody of
Appellant from Mr. Ilov, and from that point on, "he was being
held by the police" (T.2 13).
When Appellant later testified, the prosecutor also
asked Appellant if the police officers questioned him, and
Appellant indicated that they did not (T.2 54-55).
At the time Officer Miller asked Appellant what was
going on, Appellant was physically restrained (Officer Miller was
17

holding his arms behind his back) (T.2 10-11), was the suspect of
the alleged crime (T.2 11, 9 ) , and was not free to go (T.2 1011).

Under any test, Appellant was in custody when Officer

Miller asked him what was going on, and was entitled to a Miranda
warning.

See generally Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168,

1170-1173 (Utah 1983)(majority opinion and concurring opinion of
Justice Durham canvas the various tests applicable in determining
when Miranda rights must be given).

See also Utah Code Ann.

section 77-7-1 ("An arrest is an actual restraint of the person
arrested or submission to custody.

The person shall not be

subjected to any more restraint than is necessary for his arrest
and detention.).
In allowing the prosecution to discuss Appellant's
failure to exculpate himself after he was arrested and prior to
his receipt of Miranda warnings, the trial court violated
Appellant's state and federal constitutional and statutory
rights.

Constitution of Utah, Article I sections 7 and 12;

United States Constitution Amendments V and XIV; Utah Code Ann.
section 78-24-9; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436 (1966).

See

also Matter of Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah
1988)(indicating that the State privilege against selfincrimination may be interpreted more broadly than its federal
counterpart); Untermyer v* State Tax Commission, 129 P.2d 881,
885 (Utah 1942)(noting that federal due process precedents are
"persuasive" in the interpretation of the State due process
provision).
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III.
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF A ROBBERY
TO WHICH APPELLANT HAD PLED GUILTY, BUT
FOR WHICH APPELLANT HAD NOT BEEN SENTENCED.
Prior to trial, on November 29, 1988, Appellant
submitted a motion in limine, seeking to exclude "any evidence of
prior robberies alleged to have been committed by the defendant,
on the grounds said prior acts are more prejudicial than
probative, and do not meet the requirements Rule 404(b), Utah
Rules of Evidence."

(R. 85). Additionally, Appellant submitted

a motion in limine, seeking to exclude evidence of a plea of
guilty to a charge of robbery in another case, on the following
grounds:
1. Said plea has not yet resulted in judgment
and conviction as the defendant has not yet
been sentenced in that case.
2. Evidence of said plea is more prejudicial
than probative when considered in light of
the standards of Rule 609(a)(1) and State v.
Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986).
(R. 87).
The hearing on these motions occurred on November 30,
1988.

4

Defense counsel indicated that the guilty plea mentioned

in the second motion in limine had been entered before Judge

4
The transcript of the hearing on the motion in limine
appears in the second part of the volume of transcript marked
"139", and will be referred to as (M.H.). The transcript marked
"139" contains three parts: a hearing granting a continuance on
the motion in limine hearing ("C.H."), the motion in limine
hearing ("M.H."), and the sentencing hearing ("S.H."). The
pagination of each of these three parts begins with the numeral
1.
The trial is recorded in two volumes, marked "137" and
"138", which shall be referred to respectively as (T.) and (T.2).
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Brian, and the sentence relating to that plea had not yet been
imposed (M.H. 2 ) . Defense counsel indicated that as part of the
plea bargain before Judge Brian, the state had agreed not to file
charges in any of several robberies in which Appellant was a
suspect (M.H. 2 ) . The prosecution apparently informed defense
counsel that it intended to present evidence of the robbery
involved in the plea before Judge Brian, and evidence of one of
the robberies the State had agreed not to file on during the plea
negotiations before Judge Brian (M.H. 2 ) .
The trial court found that for purposes of Utah Rule of
Evidence 609, the robbery was a crime of dishonesty, and the
guilty plea, for which no sentence had yet been imposed, was
admissible as a conviction under the rule (M.H. 5, T. 92, 93).
At the motion hearing, the trial court took under advisement the
objections relating to proof of the facts of the robbery and
Rules of Evidence 404 and 403, indicating the probability that
the evidence of the robbery would be admitted (M.H. 29).
After the State presented its case-in-chief, defense
counsel again argued the inadmissibility of the evidence of the
facts underlying the robbery that the State intended to admit in
rebuttal to Appellant's anticipated testimony (T. 87-100). Again
indicating its probable intent to admit the evidence, the court
stated,
From what I have heard here, I would
allow it in. I may change my mind after the
defendant testifies because I haven't heard
any testimony yet. I only hear lawyer talk
so far. But from what I have heard here, I
would probably allow in that evidence as to
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go to show intent and possibly modus
operandi.
(T. 100).
During Appellant's cross-examination, the prosecutor
asked Appellant if he had ever been convicted of a robbery, and
Appellant admitted that he had pled guilty to a robbery (T.2 55).
During redirect and recross examinations, Appellant indicated
that he committed the robbery because he was addicted to cocaine
and needed some, but indicated that prior to the incident
involving Mr. Moor, Appellant had accepted responsibility for the
unrelated robbery and entered a drug treatment program and was
not using drugs at the time of the encounter with Mr. Moor (T.2
56-66).
In rebuttal, the State called Paul Thayne Christensen,
and defense counsel objected (T.2 68-73).

He testified that he

used to be a delivery person for Free Wheeler Pizza, and that in
June of 1988, Appellant had robbed him at gunpoint (T.2 74-75).
He indicated that he was making a delivery about 1:00 a.m., and
that Appellant came around the house where the pizza was to be
delivered, asked how much the pizza was and searched for his
wallet to pay for it, and then pulled out a gun and demanded
money (T.2 76-77).

The address of this robbery was between 13th

and 15th South and Windsor Street (T.2 78). Mr. Christensen
indicated that the robbery happened very quickly and that
Appellant made no mention of recognizing Mr. Christensen from
prior occasions (T.2 79).
Appellant testified in surrebuttal that the robbery of
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Mr. Christensen was the only one Appellant has committed, and
indicated that the robbery charge pending in the instant case was
not true (T.2 88).
A. A GUILTY PLEA FOR WHICH NO SENTENCE HAS BEEN IMPOSED IS NOT A
"CONVICTION" ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 609.
The State argued that under Rule 609, for purposes of
impeachment, a guilty plea is a conviction (M.H. 15-16).

The

trial court indicated some doubt about this assertion, indicating
that there was no way for the court to know whether Judge Brian
would arrest judgment, or sentence Appellant to a lesser offense
(M.H. 15). The trial court later ruled that the guilty plea was
a conviction for purposes of Rule 609 (T. 92).
Rule 609 provides as follows:
(a) For the purpose of attacking
the credibility of a witness, evidence that
he has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if elicited from him or established
by public record during cross-examination but
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted, and the
court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2)
involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
(b) Evidence of a conviction under this
rule is not admissible if a period of more
than ten years has elapsed since the date of
the conviction or of the release of the
witness from the confinement imposed for
that conviction, whichever is the later date,
unless the court determines, in the interests
of justice, that the probative value of the
conviction supported by specific facts and
circumstances substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a
conviction more than ten years old as
calculated herein, is not admissible unless
the proponent gives to the adverse party
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sufficient advance written notice of intent
to use such evidence to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to contest the
use of such evidence.
(c) Evidence of a conviction is not
admissible under this rule if (1) the
conviction has been the subject of a pardon,
annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or
other equivalent procedure based on a finding
of the rehabilitation of the person
convicted, and that person has not been
convicted of a subsequent crime which was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year, or (2) the conviction has been
the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other
equivalent procedure based on a finding of
innocence.
(d) Evidence of juvenile adjudications
is generally not admissible under this rule.
The court may, however, in a criminal case
allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of
a witness other than the accused if
conviction of the offense would be admissible
to attack the credibility of an adult and the
court is satisfied that admission in evidence
is necessary for a fair determination of the
issue of guilt or innocence.
(e) The pendency of an appeal therefrom
does not render evidence of a conviction
inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an
appeal is admissible.
While it appears that the issue of the admissibility
under this rule of a guilty plea for which no sentence has been
imposed is a matter of first impression in Utah,

analysis of

the reasoning applied by the Idaho Supreme Court, working under a
similar statutory sentencing scheme, demonstrates that such
guilty pleas should not be admissible for impeachment purposes.
In State v. Cliett, 534 P.2d 476 (Idaho 1975), the

4
But see State v. Delashmutt, 676 P.2d 383 (Utah
1983)(poorly reasoned per curiam opinion, finding a guilty plea
admissible for impeachment purposes under Utah Code Ann. section
78-24-9).
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defendant was convicted of grand larceny of eighty six pigs.
at 477.

Id.

When the prosecution called the defendant's ex-wife to

testify against him, he attempted to present evidence that she
had pled guilty to a felony - issuing checks without funds in the
bank - but because her trial court had withheld sentencing her
pending eighteen months of probation, the defendant was not
allowed to impeach his ex-wife with evidence of her guilty plea.
Id. at 478.
In reviewing the propriety of excluding this
impeachment evidence, the appellate court first noted that there
is a split of authority on the issue of whether a guilty plea
for which no judgment and sentence has been entered constitutes a
conviction useful for impeachment evidence.

Ld. at 478-479.

The

court explained that if a guilty plea were considered a
"conviction" prior to the imposition of sentence, the
ameliorative provision allowing for withholding of sentence
pending probation would be undermined because the defendant would
be stigmatized as a felon,

^d. at 480.

The court concluded that

the guilty plea was not useful for impeachment evidence because
there was a possibility that the trial court would not adjudge
the defendant's ex-wife guilty if she successfully completed the
probation.

Ld. at 479-480.
In Utah, statutory guidelines concerning sentencing

also contain a provision that ameliorates the penalties and
burdens for the commission of crime.
3-402 states:
24

Utah Code Ann. section 76-

(1) If the court, having regard to the
nature and circumstances of the offense of
which the defendant was found guilty and to
the history and character of the defendant,
concludes that it would be unduly harsh to
record the conviction as being for that
category of offense established by statute
and to sentence the defendant to an
alternative normally applicable to that
offense, the court may, unless otherwise
specifically provided by law, enter a
judgment of conviction for the next lower
category of offense and impose sentence
accordingly.
(2) Whenever a conviction is for a
felony, the conviction shall be deemed to be
a misdemeanor if:
(a) The judge designates the
sentence to be for a misdemeanor
and the sentence imposed is within
the limits provided by law for a
misdemeanor; or
(b) The imposition of the
sentence is stayed and the
defendant is placed on probation,
whether committed to jail as a
condition of probation or not, and
he is thereafter discharged without
violating his probation.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be
construed to preclude any person from
obtaining or being granted an expungement of
his record as provided by law.
Previous Utah Cases have demonstrated a policy to
interpret strictly the evidentiary requirements of proving a
conviction, in order to facilitate ameliorative sentencing
provisions.

In State v. Jones, 581 P.2d 141 (Utah 1978), the

court ruled that under former Rule of Evidence 21, a conviction
for giving false information to the police, which had been
expunged, is not admissible in evidence for impeachment purposes.
The court explained:
It is the prerogative of the legislature
to prescribe what shall be the penalties and
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burdens for the commission of crime, as well
as for any amelioration thereof. It has
provided that under certain circumstances
convictions for crime may be expunged; and it
further provides that when that is
accomplished:
Upon the entry of the order in
those proceedings, the petitioner
shall be deemed judicially pardoned
and the petitioner may thereafter
respond to any inquiries relating
to convictions of crimes as though
that conviction never occurred.
The purpose of that^ statute is obvious
and its intent is clearly stated: that even
after a person is convicted of a crime, in
appropriate circumstances he may comply with
prescribed procedures which shall have the
effect of a judicial pardon; and that
thereafter he may respond to any inquiry
concerning his record as though that
conviction had never occurred.
5
Id. at 142.
Further, a guilty plea may be withdrawn by the court
prior to sentencing.

See State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1302-1306

(Utah 1986)(discussing the circumstances in which a trial court

5
Utah Code Ann. section 77-18-2(5)(b) currently provides
that records subject to expungement may be opened by a court
during sentencing proceedings:
For judicial sentencing, a court may
order any records sealed under this section
to be opened and admitted into evidence. The
records are confidential and are available
for inspection only by the court, parties,
counsel for the parties, and any other
person who is authorized by the court to
inspect them. At the end of the action or
proceeding, the court shall order the records
sealed again.
There is no parallel provision indicating that convictions
entered pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-402 may be
considered elevated during sentencing for subsequent crimes.
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may declare a misplea after accepting a guilty plea). 5
Because Judge Brian had not yet adjudged Appellant
guilty of any offense or imposed a sentence relating to
Appellant's guilty plea, the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of Appellant's guilty plea for purposes of impeachment
under Rule 609.
B. ROBBERY IS NOT A CRIME OF DISHONESTY AUTOMATICALLY ADMISSIBLE
UNDER UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 609(a)(2).
During the hearing on Appellant's motions in limine#
the trial court indicated its reliance on State v* Cintron, 680
P.2d 33 (Utah 1984), and found that Appellant's guilty plea to
robbery would be automatically admissible under Utah Rule of
Evidence 609(a)(2) as a crime of dishonesty (M.H. 4-5).
Numerous cases subsequent to the Cintron decision
demonstrate that the trial court was in error in admitting the

6
The Court in Kay was acting under Utah Code Ann.
section 77-35-11(8), which provides as follows:
(8)(a) The judge may not participate in plea
discussions prior to any agreement being made
by the prosecuting attorney.
(b) When a tentative plea agreement has
been reached that contemplates entry of a
plea in the expectation that other charges
will be dropped or dismissed the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the
disclosure to him of the tentative agreement
and the reasons for it, in advance of the
time for tender of the plea. The judge may
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and
defense counsel whether he will approve the
proposed disposition.
(c) If the judge then decides that final
disposition should not be in conformity with
the plea agreement, he shall advise the
defendant and then call upon the defendant to
either affirm or withdraw his plea.
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robbery guilty plea because it did not bear directly on
Appellant's credibility.

See State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 16-19

(Utah Ct.App. 1988)("the crime of robbery is not necessarily one
of dishonesty or false statement"); State v. Brown, 771 P.2d
1093, 1094-1095 (Utah Ct.App* 1989)("theft is not necessarily a
crime involving dishonesty or false statement"); State v. Lanier,
778 P.2d 9, 10-11 (Utah 1989)(convictions for burglary and
robbery were not admissible under 609(a)(2)); State v. Bruce, 779
P.2d 646, 653-656 (Utah 1989)(retail theft and attempted burglary
die not relate directly to credibility, were not admissible under
609(a)(2)); State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 222 n.2 (Utah
Ct.App.)(Jackson, J., dissenting)(noting the persuasiveness of
federal cases limiting admission under 609(a)(2) to convictions
that "bear directly on a witness's propensity not to tell the
truth."), cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
After finding erroneously that robbery is a crime of
dishonesty, the trial court refused to consider the factors
pertinent to admissibility under 609(a)(1) (M.H. 5 ) . In
admitting evidence of Appellant's guilty plea to robbery, the
trial court violated Utah Rule of Evidence 609.
Even if the robbery of Mr. Christensen involved
dishonesty or were admissible under 609(a)(1), the manner of
proof allowed under Rule 609 is limited to proof by public record
or by the admission of the defendant.

See also State v.

Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Utah 1977)(explaining the
rationale behind the limitations on the manner of proof of
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convictions, under the former rules of evidence).

The facts

underlying the robbery as described by the victim, Mr.
Christensen, were inadmissible under Rule 609.
C. IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS UNDERLYING THE ROBBERY
GUILTY PLEA, THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 404.
The prosecutor presented the testimony of Mr.
Christensen relating to the facts underlying Appellant's robbery
guilty plea under Rule 404, as evidence of Appellant's intent to
rob Mr. Moor (M.H. 17-21).
The trial court took the motion in limine under
advisement, indicating that the court was inclined to admit the
evidence as proof of intent, plan, preparation and modus operandi
(T. 100; M.H. 29).
Review of the statement of facts reveals that
Appellant's intent was not the issue in conflict.

Rather, it was

Appellant's physical actions that were contested.

While Mr. Moor

testified that Appellant held a weapon against him, and told him
he was being robbed (T. 12-68), Appellant testified that
Appellant did not hold a weapon against Mr. Moor, did not
tell Mr. Moor he was robbing him, but was collecting a debt, as
acknowledged at that time by Mr. Moor (T.2 20-66).
In these circumstances, the testimony of Mr.
Christensen was not admitted to prove Appellant's intent.

7
Compare State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 427 (Utah
1989)(in trial involving aggravated sexual assault and aggravated
burglary, evidence of defendant's lustful conduct with two women
seven hours before the assault subject to trial was not relevant
to intent involved in assault).
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Rather, it was admitted to support the inference that Appellant
robbed Mr. Moor because, as demonstrated by the robbery of Mr.
Christensen, it was Appellant's nature to do so.

Under Rule 404#

this inference is not one the court could properly cillow the
jurors to make; "Evidence of other crime, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith."
In admitting Mr. Christensen1s testimony as proof of
plan, preparation, or modus operandi, the court fell into "the
common error of equating acts and circumstances which are merely
similar in nature with the more narrow common scheme or plan."
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989).
The trial court's first error was in applying the modus
operandi theory of admission in a case in which identity was not
in dispute.

As explained in Featherson,

"As noted at the outset, this case presented
no issue of identity. No rational argument
would support a contention that the three
sets of sex crimes were part of one larger
plan. There being no issue of identity, it
is immaterial whether the modus operandi of
the charged crime was similar to that of the
uncharged offenses. While the People rely on
the 'common plan or scheme' rational for
admissibility, under the circumstances that
is merely a euphemism for 'disposition.'"
Id. at 429, quoting People v. Tassell, 679 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal
1984)(footnotes omitted by the Featherson court).
Second, it should be noted that robbery of pizza
delivery people is not unique.

During the sentencing hearing,

defense counsel argued that Appellant's sentence should run
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concurrently with the sentence imposed by Judge Brian, stating as
follows:
I went through the police reports of the
other outstanding pizza robberies, that the
State at one time suspected Mr. Morrell of.
The descriptions do not fit Mr. Morrell.
They range from a body build like a walrus to
a small hispanic, to white in color or from
light colored hair to blonde to dark,
straight. There are a number of outstanding
pizza robberies, but there hasn't been
identification of Mr. Morrell committed
those.
(S.H. 3 ) . The State did not contest these assertions (S.H. 3 ) .
Compare State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 428-429 (Utah
1989)(listing cases discussing similar crimes which do not prove
modus operandi under Rule 404).
Finally, there were numerous distinctions between
Appellant's robbery of Mr. Christensen and his encounter with Mr.
Moor.

For example, with Mr. Christensen, Appellant called the

pizza company and used a gun to rob Mr. Christensen of all
available funds (T.2 88-89).

With Mr. Moor, the only competent

proof of how the encounter came about was that Appellant
recognized Mr. Moor on the street, and used, either no weapon or
a knife to collect a specified sum from Mr. Moor, pursuing
collection of that specified sum to several locations (T. 12-68).
The prosecutor in the instant case conceded that the facts
underlying the crimes were not identical, "I don't think that
[factual discrepancy between the crimes] is a big deal because,
again, we are not talking about a signature crime or modus
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operandi type approach.11

(M.H. 27).

D. ADMISSION OF THIS EVIDENCE VIOLATED UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 403.
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides as follows:
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
As demonstrated by subpoints A through C, the evidence
relating to the robbery of Mr. Christensen had no legitimate
probative value under the rules of evidence.
unadjudicated crimes is presumed prejudicial.
699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985).

Such evidence of
State v. Saunders,

In admitting the evidence

relating to the robbery of Mr. Christensen, the trial court
violated Utah Rule of Evidence 403.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS REQUIRE REVERSAL.
The trial court's two-fold violation of Appellant's
right to confrontation is reversible unless proven harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Utah 1987).

State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204

To find these Confrontation Clause violations to be

harmless error, this Court must find that the verdict would have
been the same, even if Appellant had succeeded in impeaching the
witnesses that the trial court prevented him from confronting.
See Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 687-688

8
Compare State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1161-1165
(Utah 1980)(prior acts similar to those charged were admissible
to show modus operandi).
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(1985)(Marshall, dissenting).
Inasmuch as this case involves two conflicting
witnesses, Appellant's conviction apparently rests on the jury's
decision to believe Mr. Moor.

Had Appellant been allowed to

corroborate his own version of the facts and undermine Mr. Moor's
version of the facts by thorough cross-examination of Mr. Moor,
it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the jurors would
have convicted Appellant.

Similarly, if Appellant had been able

to impeach the witnesses quoted by Officer Wayment, relating to
the fact that the encounter with Mr. Moor and the robbery of Mr.
Christensen were initiated by calls from pay phones from
addresses other than the addresses to which the pizzas were to be
delivered, the State's improper efforts to prove Appellant's
robber-like disposition would have been stymied.
The trial court's permission of improper comment on
Appellant's post-arrest silence must also be proved harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Bartley, Case No. 880375-CA,

filed Dec. 20, 1989, slip opinion at 9.

The credibility of the

two opposing witnesses was the crux of this case.

It cannot

safely be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the jurors would
have convicted Appellant if they had not been contaminated by
the prosecutor's presentation of Appellant's failure to exculpate
himself immediately upon arrest.
The trial court's admission of irrelevant unadjudicated
criminal conduct is presumed prejudicial.
P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985).

State v. Saunders, 699

Inasmuch as the facts concerning Mr.
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Christensen involved a robbery of a pizza delivery person
occurring within months of the encounter with Mr. Moor, and
inasmuch as the jurors were improperly instructed that the
evidence relating to the robbery of Mr. Christensen could be used
to impeach Mr. Moor's credibility and to show "proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident." (R. 98-99), the presumption of
prejudice attached to this evidence cannot be rebutted.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Appellant's conviction and
remand this case to the trial court for a new tria^.
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APPENDIX I

Valley.
•v

'"/here does he live now?

A

I am not sure.

" hav<=* called his house hut his

number has been disconnected.

I haven't seen him tor a

while.
Q

What number did you call?

A

I have it written down.

Q

He did have a telephone?

A

Yes. he did.

I am not for sure.

He lived on —

What is it?

Right

by Pioneer Hospital.
Q

So, you had met Mr. Moor three times?

A

Twice.

Q

Twice, altogether?

A

Well, the third time was when he was in his car

doing the pizza delivery.
Q

You are contending that Mr. Moor owed you

money?
A

Yes, I do.

Q

He owed you money for what?

A

For some marijuana.

Q

Are you a pharmacist, Mr. Morreli?

A

No, I am not.

Q

Are you aware that the sale of mari.juana is

illegal?
A

I wasn't selling.

I know it is illegal for
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possession, but I did not actually sell it to him.
Q

What do you call it if you give somebody

marijuana and you expect to get $40 in return?
A

I told him he could pay me back later.

didn't want to use it anymore, okay?
had been smoking it.

I had it on me.

He said, "You want to

I have got a friend."

Q

And how much was it?

A

It was $45.

Q

What quantity of marijuana was involved?

A

I am not sure.

T said, "Is that okay?"
Q

I

Scott asked me if I had any left.

I said, "This is all I have got."
get rid of it?

I

I just told him to pay me 345.
And he said, "Yeah."

You don't consider that to be the sale of

marijuana?
no.

A

I didn't sell it for a profit,

0

What did you sell it for?

A

I did him a favor.

G

But in your mind there is no doubt you expected

to-get money for it?
A

Yeah, he told me he would pay it back.

"That is fine.

I said,

I know where you work."

Q

When did this transaction occur?

A

In July.

Q

You recall what date?
47

A

Latter parr of July, around Pioneer h y ,

somewhere around there, around that week.
Q

What location did this parry occur "hat this

transaction took place?
A

On the east side. Anywhere around 9th or 11th

East, about: there.
Q

Somebody lived there?

A

It was at a house, yeah.

Q

How did you find out about it.?

A

Scott took me to the party.

Q

He knew where a party was and he took you

there?
A

Yeah.

Q

You know who lived there?

A

No, I didn't know the people who was -brewing

the party.
Q

You knew anybody there?

A

I knew Scott and I met Matthew once before and

I knew him.

It is not unusual to not knew anybody there.

I don't go up on the east side.
Q

Did you make a telephone call to Ambassador

Pizza in the morning hours of September 5th?
A

No, I did not.

Q

So, is it your testimony that it was *

coincidence that upon your arrival at home, a person who

owed you money and whose car you recognized, just
happened to be driving by your house?
A

It happens like that sometimes, yes.

What

comes around goes around, I think.
Q

Are you sure that you were standing on the

corner of Genessee and 3th West at the time that the car
came by?
A

I am not positive.

I know where I live, yes.

Q

You heard Mr. Moor testify he saw a person

standing on the corner of Genessee and 8th West.

Did you

hear that testimony?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

Is Mr. Moor lying?

A

No.

corner.

I didn't say I wasn't standing on that

I said I seen his car go around the corner, make

a left on 3th West and go up to the street.
over to the corner.
Q

I walked

It is only half a block away.

Residence at 814 West 8th South, is there

anybody else living there with you?
A

Yes.

It is called "Dryer's Club."

It is a

house for people who are trying to stop drinking and get
off of drugs.
Q

How long have you been living there?

A

Maybe a month, about a month and a half.

About

a month and a half.
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Q

Did you offer to buy the pizza that Matt had in

his car?
A

No, I did note

Q

But you said that he shoved it at you in some

A

Yes.

Q

What happened when he shoved it at you?

A

Well, he tried to push it out of the window,

way?

trying to push me back.
Q

And what did you do?

A

I reached down and I grabbed him right hers and

I said, "Hey, what are you trying to do, man?"
Q

What happened to the pizza?

A

The pizza was still sitting there pushed up

against me.
Q

How did it get outside of the vehicle?

A

When I walked around to the side of the car, he

let it go out of the car, I guess.
Q

He just dropped it in the street?

A

Yeah.

Q

You didn't, want to buy it?

A

No, I never asked to buy the pizza.-

Q

It was kind of late and I guess he just wanted

to get rid of it; is that right?
A

I have no idea.

Maybe he was scared.

Maybe he
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found out somebody who he owed money wasn't, going to let
him ^ e t o v ^ r ^ n him.
Q

You think that Matt Moor might have been

A

Well, I am sure he was.

I guess.

I never

thought I would find him and get the money from him that
he owed me.
Q

He knew I knew where he worked.

How is it a man you met three times before in

your life, is a good enough friend for you to sell
marijuana?
A

Cause I have known Scott for about a year.

I

trust his judgment.
Q

And Scott said this guy is okay?

A

Yeah, he knew Matthew.

I don't know7 how long,

but he knew him.
Q

When Matt Moor, under oath, says to Ms. Ley

that he doesn't knew anybody named Scott Perry, he

is

lying again, right?
A

Obviously.

Scott knew him.

Q

Did you tell Matt how much money ycu wanted

from him?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

How much did you tell him?

A

I told him 345.

Q

You didn't say to him at anytime, "I need

at
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